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Abstract 
This paper opens with a story of the mobility and varied temporalities of a 
particular landscape and uses this to reflect on a range of issues that revolve 
around the different kinds of ‘grounding’ that are appealed to in socio-cultural, 
political and academic life. It reflects upon the relations between human and 
natural sciences, the nature of appeals between them, and the important, but often 
questionable, place within this of particular political positions. It goes on to query 
the role of ‘Nature’ as a grounding to place and landscape and stresses the 
potentially differential effectivities of contrasting temporalities --- between, for 
example, the temporalities of the taskspace and the temporalities of tectonics. 
Nonetheless, the argument continues, there are indeed provocations from the 
moving rocks to the nature of scientific discourse and to debates within political 
philosophy. It concludes with a conceptualisation of both landscape and place as 
events. 
 
Keywords  
Space, landscape, nature, anti-foundationalism, places, localism, 
human/natural science relations, ‘dwelling’, temporalities, ‘the political’. 
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Landscape as a provocation: reflections on moving 
mountains 
Introduction 
The reflections that form the body of this paper take off from a moment when 
I was thinking about something rather different. I wanted to cite a quotation from 
Barbara Bender, but was unable to find the source. In exasperation, and on the last 
minute, I telephoned Barbara who said two things: firstly that it was a lovely 
quotation but secondly that she could not remember the source either. We agreed 
that it would go down as ‘Bender (pers.comm.)’. 
The quotation was this: ‘Landscapes refuse to be disciplined. They make a 
mockery of the oppositions that we create between time (History) and space 
(Geography), or between nature (Science) and culture (Social Anthropology). 
At the time, I was completing a book (Massey, 2005) and I shall briefly 
recapitulate one story from there before taking the argument off in a rather 
different direction.(1) The concern was ‘place’, a concept that I had wrestled with 
for a long time, on the one hand rejecting the parochialisms and the exclusivities 
that a commitment to place can generate and yet on the other hand wanting to 
hang on to a genuine appreciation of the specificity of local areas. It was in an 
attempt to transcend the dismal apparent opposition between those impetuses that 
the notion of ‘a global sense of place’ emerged (Massey, 1991). This aimed to 
evoke place as meeting place rather than as always already coherent, as open 
rather than bounded, as an ongoing production rather than pre-given. It aimed at 
an appreciation of place that did not entail parochialism. It had, however, 
remained entirely within the realm of human social relations, a fact I was 
forcefully reminded of by a friend whose sense of place was utterly bound up with 
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the hills amongst which she lived. It was a challenge I was pondering on a visit, 
some time later, to the English Lake District. 
Outside the town of Keswick looms Skiddaw, a grey slab of a mountain, 
about 3000 feet high, an immobile, immovable, presence set against the scurrying 
tourism in the settlement below. Over the fortunes and intersections of ‘place as 
meeting place’, it had presided. It seemed in that sense foundational. Indeed, some 
criticisms had been made of ‘a global sense of place’, and of related arguments by 
others, that in the stress on social relations and in the emphasis on openness and 
change a sense of groundedness had been lost (see, for instance, Dirlik, 2001). 
What was missing, the critics argued, was any sense of foundation and stable 
locatedness. Moreover, it was posited, for that to be restored ‘Nature’ would have 
to be brought back into the picture. 
Now, of course, the topographies of landscapes are constantly evolving. In 
the Lake District the geomorphological evidence of glaciation is all about. But 
nonetheless that mountain, Skiddaw, seemed of a different order. In fact, of 
course, it is not. However to appreciate this it is necessary to engage with a 
temporality of landscape that is of quite different dimensions. Briefly: Skiddaw is 
composed of Ordovician slates which were laid down as sediments some 500 
million years ago. However what snagged my attention as I was thinking of this 
history was that when they were laid down, in a sea that we now call the Iapetus 
Ocean, they were one-third of the way south of the equator towards the south 
pole. It was hundreds of millions of years later that these rocks of Skiddaw 
crossed the equator on their way through this latitude, now, and later still that they 
were formed into anything we might call a mountain. What is important here is 
not the formal knowledge (such tectonic wanderings are now part of popular 
science) but what one allows it to do to the imagination. For me, initially, this 
dwelt upon the thought that these are immigrant rocks, arrived ‘here’ from 
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somewhere else. It was an imagination that was happily congruent, therefore, with 
the notion of a global sense of place. It is with some reflections upon that 
congruence that this article is concerned. 
First Reflection 
The notion of rocks as immigrant had also been seized upon in a poster 
produced as part of a campaign in the city of Hamburg. A huge rock, dredged up 
in the river Elbe, and which had become loved by the inhabitants of the city, 
turned out not to be a ‘local’ rock at all. Rather it hailed from the north, probably 
Sweden, a glacial erratic left behind by the retreating ice. The poster pictured it in 
a campaign around immigration rights, dubbing the rock ‘our oldest immigrant’. 
In the production of this poster the understanding of ‘nature’ as endlessly 
geographically mobile enabled some political messages to be established and, 
equally significantly, others to be undermined. Most immediately it problematised 
any notion of intrinsic indigeneity (in the sense of having been eternally present), 
any question of things being essentially and only local.(2) It problematised the 
notion of local belonging. It demonstrated both allegorically and materially that 
local place identity does not grow out of the soil. (If even the soil is not ‘local’…) 
The importance of such demonstrations was that they undermined certain political 
claims to place, and in particular those arguments against in-migration based on 
notions of a dichotomy between authentically local on the one hand and 
foreign/intruder on the other.(3) In other words, this presentation of geology and 
geomorphology --- this re-imagination of the ground beneath our feet --- was 
proffered as both metaphorical reinforcement and scientific legitimation of a 
particular political stance. The erratic rock of the Elbe was mobilised, as was the 
Skiddaw story, precisely because they reinforced so well positions that had 
already been taken. 
 6 
This is a familiar practice. References from the social sciences and the 
humanities to the natural sciences flourish everywhere (Massey, 2005). Such 
references, however, necessarily involve ‘representations’ derived from the 
sciences being referred to. They involve a kind of second-order representational 
practice --- the representations, by others, within their own disciplinary structures 
and concerns, and of their own, constituted, disciplinary objects, are either eagerly 
seized-upon, or left to one side. One of the complexities of Barbara Bender’s book 
Stonehenge (1998) is her insistence upon a recursive reflexivity that addressed her 
own representational practices, and such a strategy is necessary also in references 
between the ‘human’ and ‘natural’ sciences. Steve Hinchliffe (2003), in a 
consideration of landscapes and natures, reflects precisely upon this, as does 
David Demeritt’s (1994a) essay on the nature of metaphors. 
As Hinchliffe argues, ‘the natures that we ( … ) want to include in landscape 
histories and geographies are unlikely to be innocent’ (p.209). This does not 
mean, as Hinchliffe is careful to point out, that ‘science is necessarily flawed’, nor 
that a guaranteeably ‘truthful’ representation of nature is possible. Indeed, the 
burden of his argument is that: 
there are ways of engaging with landscapes and natures that refuse 
to see either as pure culture ( … ) or as raw matter ( … ). The 
intention is to avoid any understanding of nature that reduces ‘it’ to 
primary ( … ) properties (a tactic I will refer to pejoratively as a 
first nature politics) and yet, at the same time, to refuse to obliterate 
spaces of nature by reading all instances of human/non-human 
relations as somehow culturally determined. (p.207) 
Demeritt, likewise, seeks to plot out a way between the two polar positions 
(in his case represented by environmental history on the one hand and cultural 
geography on the other). In his case the way ahead is indicated by the work of 
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Bruno Latour and, especially, Donna Haraway. What both authors stress, is that it 
is necessary to be aware of, and open to the critique of, those practices and 
positions which are being adopted. There is, inevitably and already, here in 
process some element of human/nonhuman mutual construction. It is impossible 
to avoid any grounding --- at least in the sense of provisional founding 
assumptions --- at all. 
One point that might be registered here is a kind of inequality that often 
occurs between the treatment of the so-called natural and the treatment of the so-
called cultural. While there is frequent anxiety about any approach to nature, and 
an insistence on the impossibility of immediate access to ‘the real’ (our natures 
are always culturally mediated), the products of culture themselves --- artefacts, 
texts, discourses --- are often approached without any such reservation. 
Moreover, this argument --- about the producedness of science and of our 
understandings of the physical world --- is in practice most often mobilised in 
critique of those readings which, for some reason or another, we reject. The 
reason, in other words, is not one based in the science itself. If followed 
scrupulously, the argument can lead to difficulties. Thus Demeritt (1994b) 
analyses in detail the contortions that can result when a critique, through reference 
to its ‘socially constructed’ nature, of the science one is opposed to, can 
uncomfortably be turned back into an examination of the alternative science on 
which one had  implicitly been relying. Demeritt is referring to ecological science, 
but the cases could be multiplied. Thus, to take one very established but very 
different example: ‘identity’ has over recent decades been subject to dramatic 
reconceptualisation. No longer is identity (on the broader canvass, ‘entities’) to be 
theorised as an internally coherent bounded discreteness. Rather it is 
conceptualised relationally --- with implications both internal (in terms of 
fragmentation, hybridity, decentering) and external (in terms of the extension of 
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connectivity). This was a move with enormous political implications: for 
feminism and those involved in struggles over sexuality, for anti-racism, for post- 
colonialism. Much of its impetus indeed came precisely from those political 
engagements, along with the parallel emergence of post-structuralism. However, 
in the mobilisation of such reconceptualisations in academic texts wider 
references are often made; and they are made in particular to the ideas of Newton 
--- how wrong his ideas were, how the billiard-ball view of identity cannot hold, 
how we know so much better now. 
What is the status of such references? Once, Newtonian science was likewise 
mobilised as guarantor (Massey, 2005; Fabian, 1983).There may well be 
disagreements within those ‘harder’ sciences, within which we are not able to 
judge. So is the function of the reference legitimation (which would seem at least 
tendentious) or as a kind of code for signing up to a wider zeitgeist? 
Other examples could be given: the wide appreciation of complexity theory 
probably chief among them. It figures largely, for instance, in the writings of the 
counter-globalisation and global justice movements, where its potential 
implications for novel forms of political organisation are frequently drawn out 
(see, for example, Notes from Nowhere, 2003). In the most extreme of cases 
positions are adopted on science as a result of what appear to be its political 
implications. This is perhaps particularly true in the case of biology. It has been 
the case with debates over whether or not there is ‘a gay gene’ and what kinds of 
differences there are between women and men. On the one hand, this cannot be 
adequate. Positions are taken regardless of an evaluation of the science itself. On 
the other hand, neither can ‘science itself’ be taken to be a pure bearer of an 
unmediated truth. 
In any case, as the debate over the existence or not of a gay gene has amply 
demonstrated, political implications are rarely guaranteed.(4) The current 
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metaphors of constant flow, distributed causation, and complexity, can both 
support the invention of new forms of democratic politics (‘from below’) and 
accurately capture some of the most devastating characteristics of neoliberal 
capitalism. Cybernetics, one of the approaches that underpins the modelling of 
ecosystems, is castigated by Demeritt (1994a) for its origins in weapons-systems 
design; but cybernetics was also explored, with far different aims, in Allende’s 
Chile. 
Second Reflection 
The critics who had been concerned that the new approaches to place, in 
emphasising the constructedness, the openness and the mobility of place, had lost 
touch with place as providing a sense of groundedness, had a number of worries. 
On the one hand there was reference to the need for place to have a grounding (in 
order that it could provide in turn a grounding for those within it). On the other 
hand there was an implication that it was ‘Nature’ that might provide it. The kind 
of grounding being sought was, it seems, a combination of locatedness and 
stability. Yet here in the northern Lakes, faced with Skiddaw, the very rocks 
were/are moving on. 
Indeed it is worth pausing here to note that the rhetorical effect of this 
movement is particularly powerful precisely as a result of its geographical 
location. It was only in the second half of the nineteenth century that this stretch 
of north-west England had emerged as ‘the Lake District’, a designation that was 
integral to a shift in its position within the national psyche. This newly designated 
Lake District functioned precisely as some kind of grounding: ‘as an area of 
national importance, an icon of stability and harmony’ (Edmonds, 2004, p.15). 
‘The Lakes had all that was needed for the making of “classic ground” outside the 
flow of modern life. Here were the ingredients of a changeless classical paradise 
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located squarely within the boundaries of the nation’ (p.15). Even the (occasional) 
figures that appeared in representations of the Lake District appeared ‘as stable 
and timeless as the lakes and fells themselves, as if they were living in some form 
of “natural state”’ (p.16).(5) 
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, quite contrasting popular 
understandings of ‘nature’ --- as endlessly mobile, restless, given to violence and 
unpredictability --- are widespread. Richard Fortey’s book The Earth: an intimate 
history (2005) is a tale of this restlessness, stressing above all that nature is never 
still, nor simply in balance; and the book sold very widely, in paperback.(6) In any 
given month there seems to be some programme on television documenting (or 
simply designed to scare us with) tornadoes, volcanoes, the crashing of tectonic 
plates. It figures as a kind of twenty-first century version of ‘nature red in tooth in 
claw’. Certainly this is not nature as stable or changeless. 
And yet one of the understandings of ‘nature’ that has recently come in for 
much criticism within the academy is that set of conceptualisations that posit an 
originary harmony or balance (see Hinchliffe, 2003; Demeritt, 1994b). Particular 
concepts of ecosystems, or of climax ecologies, can fall into this category in their 
assumptions of stable equilibria towards which constellations of interactions are 
said inevitably to be tending. Such critiques are in tune with the television 
programmes. Indeed it might seem strange that, against a popular background 
picturing of such a turbulent Nature, they are even necessary. It is rare, however, 
for one understanding to achieve an uncontested hegemony; it is normal for 
multiple conceptualisations to coexist. And again, the structuring relation of the 
critique is political. Most significantly, the notion of a nature that is harmonious 
and in balance is often mobilised in the cause of a foundationalism in which a 
settled past is necessarily presupposed in order to enable a narrative of subsequent 
loss. It is a conceptualisation that can result in (or provide the rationale for) a 
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politics in which any human ‘intervention’ in nature is seen in a negative light, a 
politics that has been widely criticised particularly for the attitudes towards 
indigenous societies in which it resulted (Hecht and Cockburn, 1989). In such a 
narrative it is, moreover, almost structurally impossible to envisage any positive 
human/nonhuman relation at all. It is a narrative that inevitably entails a nostalgia, 
and a backward-looking rather than forward-looking outlook. It is an imagination 
of the Fall, built around a pre/post lapsarian dichotomy. So Rebecca Solnit, in a 
consideration of artistic work around nature and landscape, bemoans a kind of 
environmentalism that simply retells the old story: ‘the Fall from grace, the 
Expulsion from the garden, and the subsequent sinfulness of human beings’ 
(2001, p.12). What she calls for in its place is an understanding of the world as ‘a 
continual and sometimes comic improvisation, without initial perfection or a 
subsequent fall’ (ibid, p.12).(7) 
One way of conceptualising this notion of a paradise-before-human-
intervention is in terms of a ‘First Nature’. However such a nature (of primary 
properties --- see the Hinchliffe quotation in the last section) need not necessarily 
be conceptualised as in harmonious balance. And this in turn raises other 
‘political’ issues. For if ‘Nature’ is always turbulent, troubled, indeed destructive 
as well as creative, then how are we to evaluate human intervention? With notions 
of nature-in-balance there is an ideal, although impossible, to aspire to. With 
nature mobile and out of equilibrium no guidelines are offered for political action 
or ethical stance. As Demeritt (1994b) recounts it, the disintegration of ecological 
science as a foundation for green politics leads Donald Worster to complain  
that the new uncertainty about nature, equilibrium, and stability can 
‘serve to justify the destruction wrought by contemporary industrial 
societies’ [1984, p.13]. It blunts the scientific authority of his calls 
to respect nature and, he fears, leads to an ‘environmental 
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relativism’ whereby it is impossible to distinguish ‘between the 
balance achieved by nature and that contrived by man.’ [1977, 
pp.242, 241] ‘What’, he asks, ‘does the phrase “environmental 
damage” mean in a world of so much natural chaos?’ [1990, p.16] 
(p.26). 
In fact, what has shifted in this moment of dislocation is precisely that presumed 
relationship between politics/ethics and scientific discourse. The point is that no 
longer can a political position be simply grounded in a reading of nature. The 
invention of our ethics and politics must happen elsewhere. (Indeed, as I have 
already intimated, it already does; the shift is perhaps rather in admitting it --- 
which then in turn may remove the need for legitimating references to ‘how nature 
works’ at all.)  
A currently widespread discourse within the social sciences (and elsewhere) 
is an insistence on a rejection of settledness. Indeed, it seems that the aim which is 
currently de rigueur is to ‘unsettle’ something: a notion of place, a concept of 
nature in balance. The emphasis is on constant movement, the inevitability and 
inexorability of process (rather than entity); on flow rather than territory. It has 
been an important and in some spheres quite revolutionary move. Nonetheless it 
raises a number of points that are possibly worth considering. 
Thus, it is necessary to recognise, more frequently than is the case, that this is 
a conceptual issue. Of course, in the practical conduct of the world we do 
encounter ‘entities’, there is on occasion harmony and balance; there are 
(temporary) stabilisations; there are territories and borders (and in the age of 
globalisation the continuous production of these is important to register, and their 
political significance and contradictions are multiple --- see Massey, 2005). On 
the one hand, this means that it is necessary to be alive to the political import of 
this fact. Demeritt (1994, p.174) is right to insist that ‘we need to unlearn our 
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privilege as loss’ (especially when, as here, the ‘we’ is first world as contrasted 
with fourth world cultures). But in fact there is loss, as the mobile planet, human 
and nonhuman, continues on its way. There is material loss (things will disappear 
as they are reabsorbed into the cycles of destruction and creation); and there will 
be a sense of loss on occasions also. Moreover it is important to recognise such 
losses; they can not be eradicated with the wave of a conceptual argument. They 
require political, and ethical, attention. On the other hand, it is the case that such 
senses of loss cannot justifiably be mobilised as legitimation in themselves of a 
political strategy to reject change. Change can not be rejected in other words by 
recourse to (precisely) ‘naturalisation’. I may not like the changes happening in 
my local place, but appealing to some eternal, essential (‘natural’) character of 
place that is being disturbed is no grounds for argument. Rather what are at issue 
are (should be) political questions around power, equality, ethics, democracy, and 
so on. The stake is not change itself (the denial of it in the past or the refusal of it 
in the future), for change of some sort is inevitable; rather it is the character and 
the terms of that change. It is here that the politics needs to be engaged. 
Of course, the groundedness that critics such as Dirlik are attempting to bring 
back into the picture is not of this absolute, conceptual, type. Dirlik indeed is 
explicit about this. The ‘permanence’, the ‘foundation’, that such authors are 
looking for is established in relation to human experience. It is a relational 
achievement. Thus Tim Ingold (1993) famously wrote, in relation to ‘the 
temporality of the landscape’ in Breugel’s painting ‘The Harvesters’, 
We may reasonably suppose that over the centuries, perhaps even 
millennia, this basic topography has changed but little. Set against 
the duration of human memory and experience, it may therefore be 
taken to establish a baseline of permanence. (p.166, my emphases) 
 14 
In the discipline of geography, there is considerable work on performativity which 
similarly lays stress on on-going engagement and a refusal to put thinking before 
doing. And there is writing upon landscape which either draws upon or is close to 
Ingold’s ‘dwelling’ perspective. Now, Barbara Bender has herself been critical of 
this article by Ingold, for its lack of consideration both of issues of power and 
inequality and of the historical (and geographical?) specificity of the social 
relations in play. Moreover much of such writing either assumes or does not 
question an essential harmony of rhythms and resonances --- a coherence of 
landscape. 
However there is a further point, which perhaps arises as a result of this 
assumption of harmonious coherence, and this is the spatial--temporal (and 
perhaps especially spatial) confinement of such perspectives. Even when critical, 
its evocations appear to require an intimacy of some sort. It is a confinement, a 
restriction, which can reverberate in a number of ways. It can, and perhaps most 
ironically given some of the theoretical dynamics that have given rise to it, 
‘reinstall human transcendence and so open up the old fault lines between humans 
and the rest’ (Hinchliffe, 2003, p.220). There is, indeed, a human and often 
individualistic self-absorption in much of this literature, and perhaps particularly 
in the literature in geography around performativity (see also on this, Demeritt, 
1994b). So John Wylie (2002, p.452) in his exploration of the construction of 
visibility through the presence of others cites Gilles Deleuze ‘speaking of a 
traveller who finds himself stranded upon an island’: ‘what happens when the 
other is absent in the structure of the world? Only the brutal opposition of sky and 
earth reigns with an insupportable light and an obscure abyss’ (Deleuze, 1984, 
p.56). Are sky and earth not others too? So Gaston Bachelard focuses on humans’ 
‘muscular consciousness’ (the personal, physical experience of place and 
landscape) (Bachelard, 1964, p.11) and Simon Schama on Landscape and 
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Memory (1995). Such a human focus, however, extends into a more general 
localism. There is a kind of inwardlookingness, a tendency to focus only on the 
confines of the particular landscape, or place, itself. A number of commentators 
have addressed this issue, along with the romanticism of place and landscape to 
which it can lead. Such is the express concern, for instance, of Don Mitchell 
(2001) in an explicitly political engagement with, and strong critique of, this local 
focus within, specifically, landscape geography. His suggested way out, however, 
is merely to advocate ‘scale-theory’ (‘Local theory … must give way to scale-
theory’, p.279), a response which instead of reconceptualising ‘the local’ rather 
adds further layers, of different sizes, of confinement. Cloke and Jones (2001), on 
the other hand, are acutely aware, in their argument through a Somerset orchard, 
of this range of pitfalls, and wrestle with them throughout their study. In 
particular, they point to the fact that ‘yet another problem with the dwelling 
perspective … concerns the “localness” of dwelling’ (p.660). Yet escaping it is 
difficult. 
This kind of inward-focusing is frequently reinforced in studies of landscape 
and place because of the tendency so frequently to read them through history, 
through the past, through time-embeddedness (see Cloke and Jones, 2001). Ingold 
writes that ‘To perceive the landscape is therefore to carry out an act of 
remembrance … [to engage] perceptually with an environment … pregnant with 
the past’ (1993, pp.152-3). It is not, in any way, that history and the past are not 
crucial to the understanding of place and landscape (although a more lively 
imagination of an intertwining of trajectories which also has a future which must 
be addressed would serve to counter the impression, so often left, that the present 
is some kind of achieved terminus). However, when this focus is combined with 
the human/nonhuman divide to which Hinchliffe points, ‘the past’ can all too 
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easily be reduced to human memory. And this, again, is to instate a confinement, 
this time of the temporal. 
If you stand on the slopes of the northern Lake District you can see, to the 
north across the grass bent in the wind, over to the Solway Firth and Scotland. As 
Richard Fortey writes ‘we can see how the rocks making high ground continue 
into the Lake District and further north again into Scotland’ (2005, p.438). And 
that word ‘continue’ captures perfectly the way that the present landscape, and our 
notion of it, sutures the turmoil that produced it. For, as Fortey puts it, ‘the 
leisurely bite into the British coastline that makes the Solway Firth’ … marks … 
‘where the great ocean Iapetus disappeared and two ancient continents conjoined’ 
(p.439). This continuous landscape covers over an ancient fracture and point of 
contact between the North American and Eurasian plates, one which existed 
before the fracture that the presently-widening Atlantic now marks. A memory of 
place, yes; but a more expansive one in time and in space. And a memory not just 
of ‘here’. Or rather maybe it is that the very constitution of ‘here’, of this 
landscape, and its magic, is precisely in the outrageous specialness of the current 
conjunction, this here and now. 
The temporalities in Ingold’s (1993) consideration of Breugel’s ‘The 
Harvesters’ are multiple: the temporalities of hills and valley, of paths and tracks, 
of the tree, the corn, the church, the people. Ingold writes of how these distinct 
temporalities are interwoven; of how it is these intersections indeed that make --- 
continue ongoingly to make --- the landscape. However, in part perhaps because 
of the overall tone of harmonious coherence, in part because of his human-centred 
focus on a quotidian taskscape, not much is said about the differences between 
these temporalities, the distinct ways in which they operate and their potentially 
different effectivities. In many such studies, the binding of the temporalities 
serves mainly to found the ground for human activities (see also Cloke and Jones, 
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2001). As Barbara Bender (1998) points out the aim of such dwelling-orientated 
studies is to conceive of landscape as a product of and generative of activities 
rather than representations. The result can be an over-tight, over-local, 
interweaving.(8) Thus, in his consideration of rhythms, Ingold writes ‘we resonate 
to the cycles of light and darkness, not to the rotation of the earth’ (p.163). Yet 
maybe the distinct temporalities might have the potential to induce distinct 
responses. Maybe that acknowledgement, as ‘the sun sets’ that it is in fact the 
earth that is turning, is also incorporated into our imaginative and practical 
engagement with landscape and place. Beyond the relative immediacies of human 
memory and task-based experience we engage with knowledges and imaginations 
and with the cosmologies (including precisely political cosmologies --- Fabian, 
1983) which frame them. Perhaps this can be so with the appreciation of the 
histories of those Ordovician rocks, laid down in the Iapetus Ocean, squeezed and 
contorted as the plates converged, moving over millions of years over the face of 
the planet, through their present incarnation as Skiddaw slates in a place called the 
Lake District. Maybe instead of, or as well as, the time-embeddedness that enables 
that relational achievement of the establishment of a (provisional) ground, such 
histories push a need to rethink our security. Certainly such histories have the 
potential to be read as removing the absoluteness of such grounding, so that all we 
are left with is our interdependence, a kind of suspended, constantly-being-made 
interdependence, human and beyond human. Maybe this is, or could be, one of the 
potentials of landscape as a provocation. 
But there is a final point that merits consideration about this current urge to 
unsettle, and this is that it is indeed a conceptual issue. Whether or not it claims 
legitimacy in a particular reading of the sciences of material nature, it is itself a 
kind of grounding, a position-taking. It is an anti-foundationalism --- and thus in 
itself is a position. It is from this recognition that the third reflection takes off. 
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Third Reflection 
As Demeritt (1994b) argues, and as proposed in the First Reflection here, 
‘nature’ can provide no absolute legitimation for particular scientific positions, 
and science in that sense can provide no legitimation to which a particular politics 
can appeal. As Demeritt has it, nature has provided ‘a silent, but transcendent, 
authorization for scientific and other discourses that are legitimated by appeal to 
the way the world works. Through such appeals to nature, science has replaced 
religion as the pre-eminent form of social legitimation’ (1994b, p.34). It is this 
sequential structure of appeal that must now be acknowledged as illegitimate. The 
sciences of nature should not be hailed, in that general sense, as a means of 
‘proving’ the correctness of a particular politics. 
Nonetheless, the argument can still be taken further, and this is particularly so 
if engagement with nature (in this case in the form of landscape) is expanded 
beyond the largely quotidian intimacies of the taskscape. If, that is, we follow 
Latour’s injunction to ‘learn to be affected’ and allow that to extend into wider 
realms of thought and imagination (Latour, 2001; see Hinchliffe, 2003, p.216). In 
that sense, it is possible to read those travelling, changing (‘becoming’) 
Ordovician rocks of Skiddaw through a more philosophical lens as playing into, 
or maybe as another element in, that deeper anti-foundationalism that has lain at 
the heart of many developments within modernity. This is an anti-foundationalism 
that insists on a commitment to openness and questioning. 
One of the ways this can be read is in relation to the very ‘science’ that has 
been under discussion here. Demeritt writes that ‘the idea of a singular, 
transcendental truth about the world underwrites the entire Enlightenment project’ 
(1994b, p.32). This is so. However it is nevertheless also the case, and with full 
regard to its inevitably ‘socially constructed’ character, that western science is 
also committed to a holding-open of the content of that truth; in principle it 
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proceeds by a continuous process of questioning. Of course, this itself entails a 
‘faith’, a grounding, in other things --- in that very process itself; in rationality. 
Nonetheless, to ignore those characteristics of questioning and debate can render 
one defenceless in crucial arguments. How, for instance, indeed why, distinguish 
between theories of evolution on the one hand and positions which uphold 
creationism or intelligent design on the other? Tristram Hunt, indeed, in an article 
documenting the persistent dismissal of scientific evidence (however provisional, 
however socially produced) by the administration of George W. Bush, reports that 
not only is evolution now less frequently taught in the USA, but that ‘With the 
successful assault on evolution behind them, evangelicals are starting to train their 
sights on the earth sciences of geology and physics’ (Hunt, 2005). The 
understanding that the Skiddaw slates were laid down some 500 million years ago 
and in the southern hemisphere may, then, be open to challenge. This, however, 
would not be a challenge from some other trajectory of scientific questioning, but 
rather a challenge by assertion from a holy book. Holy books themselves, though 
open to interpretation, are not open to challenge.  
It is important, then, to insist on western science as a specific and relatively 
autonomous discourse. Thus, although as previously cited ‘science has replaced 
religion as the pre-eminent form of social legitimation’ (Demeritt, 1994b, p.34) 
(though the activities of the Bush administration give pause for thought even 
here), science and religion are not simply equivalent. As Demeritt says ‘we should 
look to science not as a mirror to nature but as a useful tool for engaging our 
world critically’ (p.33), but this must be a more serious engagement than merely 
appropriating its conclusions where they ‘prove useful and convincing’ (p.33). 
Otherwise we end back in the gay-gene situation, where already-established 
political predispositions are the basis on which to evaluate science.  
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Finally, this anti-foundationalist commitment to openness and to questioning 
is central also to debates within political philosophy. As writers such as Claude 
Lefort, and others such as Chantal Mouffe within the radical democracy tradition, 
have argued, the hallmark of a fully democratic society is the ability to hold as in 
principle at risk the very foundations of the constitution of that society. Thus 
Rosalyn Deutsche, drawing on Lefort, writes of the hallmark of democracy being 
‘the disappearance of certainty about the foundations of social life’ (1996, p.272); 
where it is necessary to recognise even ‘the legitimacy of debate about what is 
legitimate and what is illegitimate’ (p.273). At this point the fact that here such 
reflections have arisen as the result of engagement with rocks importantly extends 
the normal scope of this political science debate, which so often not only restricts 
its attention to the humanly social but also implicitly or explicitly depends upon a 
nonhuman background that is harmoniously in balance (see Clark, 2002). That 
space of agonistic negotiation that is the political should be recognised as 
including negotiation also with that realm that goes by the name of nature. It will, 
moreover, be a negotiation that includes within it the very conceptualisation of 
that ‘nature’ itself. 
In such an understanding of the political, ethical principles are not legitimated 
by an appeal through science to nature. Rather it is necessary to evolve those 
principles as we go along (see, for instance, Weeks, 1995). It is, indeed, a 
responsibility to invent them, and we do it through a range of activities, practices, 
affects, engagements, discourses. It is in this sense, and as Hinchliffe (pp.207, 
222) argues about our inhabitation specifically of landscape, radically 
experimental. This, then, is a connection from the moving mountains, not to 
particular political positions, but to the nature of the (Western, modern) ‘political’ 
tout court. And, it has also finally to be stated, it too --- as the resurgence of a 
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multitude of fundamentalisms of holy books serves at the moment only too well to 
demonstrate --- is one potential position among many. 
Landscape and place 
However, if such philosophical reflections are one potential outcome of the 
provocation that is a landscape, another is the reimagining of landscape and place 
themselves. The reorientation stimulated by the conceptualisation of the rocks as 
on the move leads even more clearly to an understanding of both place and 
landscape as events, as happenings, as moments that will be again dispersed. 
One, among many, of the ways to approach landscape is through concepts of 
space and time. Hegemonic conceptualisations of time understand it as the 
ineffable dimension of change, as internal to things and as intangible.(9) In a kind 
of philosophical ‘response’, space has frequently come to be defined as time’s 
opposite (and indeed one of the problems in the conceptualisation of space has 
been this manner of understanding space as a kind of residual category, as what 
time is not). It is thus that we have space as the material world, as the given, as the 
great out there. It is in this guise that it becomes so frequently elided with land 
and landscape (space as something we travel across). In such imaginaries, both 
space and landscape take the form of surfaces. For a whole host of reasons this is 
problematical (see Massey, 2005). Rather, and once again bearing in mind the 
movement of the rocks, both space and landscape could be imagined as 
provisionally intertwined simultaneities of ongoing, unfinished, stories. Space, as 
a dimension, cuts through such trajectories, but not to stabilise them into a 
surface; rather space is imbued with time (and here we pick up again on that 
opening ‘personal communication’ from Barbara Bender). Moreover, one 
constantly emergent, ongoing, product of that intertwining of trajectories is what 
we call the landscape. (And conceptualising it thus can also encourage a 
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disaggregation of ‘Nature’ too into a multiplicity of trajectories --- a move which 
further militates against the temptations of foundationalism.) Indeed, maybe the 
very notion of ‘landscape’ has on occasions worked to suture any underlying 
constitutive jarrings and discontinuities, and evoked a surface which renders that 
intertwining --- of Histories and Geographies, as the opening quotation has it --- 
knowable and fully representable. Rather it is that a landscape, these hills, are the 
(temporary) product of a meeting up of trajectories out of which mobile 
uncertainty a future is --- has to be --- negotiated. 
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Notes 
(1) This paper was written in honour of Barbara Bender, on the occasion of her 
retirement. I should also like to acknowledge the Geography Department at 
Hull University where, on the occasion of my presenting The Appleton Bi-
annual Public Lecture on Landscape, some of these reflections began. 
(2) ‘Essentially and only local’ in the sense that they are not born of any 
connections beyond the area. 
(3) Note that this does not by any means address all the arguments that are 
mobilised against immigration. 
(4) ‘Political implications’ here in their immediate empirical sense --- see later. 
(5) Edmonds’ book not only challenges this but also stresses the wider 
geographical connectivities of those who, through the neolithic, worked this 
area. 
(6) Fortey’s book is also an example of movement across the human 
science/natural science divide, but in the opposite direction. To this social 
scientist, at least, some of these forays were embarrassing both in their 
simplicity and in their tendency to environmental determinism. 
(7) See Biggs (2005), from which these quotations were taken. 
(8) Wylie’s (2002) ascent of Glastonbury Tor is interesting here. Precisely 
though its materialisation and embodiment of the visual and visibility it 
engages with wider philosophical issues. It enables him to bring home the 
later Merleau-Ponty’s point that, being only enabled to see by the fact of 
being visible, by being visibly embodied, he is ‘one of them’ (Wylie, p.452; 
Merleau-Ponty, 1968). Yet in the end the focus is on individual subjectivity. 
(9) Conceptualisations of space, and of time, are central to Massey, 2005. The 
brief argument here depends on the far longer discussions elaborated there. 
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